http://ppkteszt.elte.hu/file/KrekoPeter_dissz.pdf.
Krekó P. Conspiracy Theory as Collective Motivated Cognition. P. 65–66.
Подробнее о теории плоской Земли см.: Garwood C. Flat Earth: The History of an Infamous Idea. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2008.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Мы очень признательны Алёне Леденёвой и Клаудии Баез-Камарго за проверку более ранней версии этой таблицы и замечания к ней.
От «пребенда» (от лат. praebenda) – слово происходит из католического канонического права и обозначает доходы и имущество, получаемые при занятии определенной должности и выполнении связанных с ней обязанностей (прим. пер.).
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 54.
Ibid. P. 54–56.
Ibid. P. 58.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 58.
Ibid. P. 60.
Ibid. P. 60–61.
Ibid. P. 60. Ср.: Ledeneva A. How Russia Really Works.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 62.
Gel’ man V. Introduction: Politics of Fear // The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality / ed. by A. Ledeneva. London: UCL Press, 2018. Vol. 2. P. 420–424.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 64.
Ibid.
Ibid. P. 65.
Ibid. P. 66–67.
Ledeneva A. How Russia Really Works. P. 105.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 67.
Ср.: Hyden G. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Mayfair Y. Guanxi (China) // The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality. Vol. 1. P. 75–79.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 57.
Ср.: Ledeneva A. Can Russia Modernise? P. 98–108.
TI, Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 – Full Source Description. Конечно, TI также дает рекомендации частным акторам, таким как НПО и журналисты, однако здесь нас интересует представление TI о формальности в целом и о государстве в частности.
Hansen H. K. The Power of Performance Indices in the Global Politics of Anti-Corruption // Journal of International Relations and Development. 2012. Vol. 15. № 4. P. 506–531; Davis K. E., Kingsbury B., Merry S. E. Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance // Law & Society Review. 2012. Vol. 46. № 1. P. 71–104.
Andersson S., Heywood P. M. The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International’ s Approach to Measuring Corruption // Political Studies. 2009. Vol. 57. № 4. P. 746–767.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 68.
Ibid. P. 69.
Ср.: Norris P., Inglehart R. Cultural Backlash.
Ср.: Pappas T. Populists in Power.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 70.
Baez-Camargo C., Ledeneva A. Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? P. 71.
Ibid. Также см.: Ledeneva A. Can Russia Modernise? P. 195.
Ср.: Trencsényi B. What Should I Call You? The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy in a Regional Interpretative Framework // Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State. P. 3–26.
Bartolini S. On Time and Comparative Research // Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1993. Vol. 5. № 2. P. 131–167.
Gerring J. What Makes a Concept Good? P. 371.
Kornai J. The System Paradigm Revisited.
Sartori G. Constitutionalism.
Ср.: Holcombe R. Political Capitalism, 2018. P. 30–33; Musacchio A., Lazzarini S. G., Aguilera R. V. New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications //Academy of Management Perspectives. 2015. Vol. 29. № 1. P. 115–131.
Magyar B. Parallel System Narratives. Как мы увидим далее, Грузия при Саакашвили тоже приблизилась к консервативной автократии после внедрения консервативной программы, ориентированной на свободный рынок.
Huneeus C. The Pinochet Regime. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007; Raby D. Controlled, Limited and Manipulated Opposition under a Dictatorial Regime: Portugal, 1945–1949. Ср.: Kallis A. The «Regime-Model» of Fascism: A Typology // European History Quarterly. 2000. Vol. 30. № 1. P. 77–104.
Ср.: Qiang X. President Xi’ s Surveillance State.
Ср.: Orts E. The Rule of Law in China.
Анализ на примере Украины см.: Kuzio T. Populism in Ukraine in a Comparative European Context // Problems of Post-Communism. 2010. Vol. 57. № 6. P. 3–18.
Howard M., Roessler P. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes // American Journal of Political Science. 2006. Vol. 50. № 2.
